Name: Independent Agencies in the United States By Professor Marshall J. Breger (Professor of Law, Professor of Law, The Catholic University of America, Columbus School of Law)
SKU: 9780199812127
Price: 195.79 USD
Availability: InStock

Independent Agencies in the United States Summary

Independent Agencies in the United States: Law, Structure, and Politics by Professor Marshall J. Breger (Professor of Law, Professor of Law, The Catholic University of America, Columbus School of Law)

It is essential for anyone involved in law, politics, and government, as well as students of the governmental process, to comprehend the workings of the federal independent regulatory agencies of the United States. Occasionally referred to as the headless fourth branch of government, these agencies do not fit neatly within any of the three constitutional branches. Their members are appointed for terms that typically exceed those of the President, and they cannot be removed from office in the absence of some sort of malfeasance or misconduct. They wield enormous power over the private sector, and they have foreign analogues. In Independent Agencies in the United States, Marshall Breger and Gary Edles provide a full-length study of the structure and workings of federal independent regulatory agencies in the US. This book focuses on traditional multi-member agencies that have a significant impact on the American economy, such as the Securities and Exchange Commission, the Federal Communications Commission, the National Labor Relations Commission, and the Federal Trade Commission. This work recognizes that the changing kaleidoscope of modern life has led Congress to create idiosyncratic administrative structures consisting of independent agencies squarely within the Executive Branch, including government corporations and government-sponsored enterprises, to establish a new construct of independence to meet the changing needs of the administrative state. In the process, Breger and Edles analyze the general conflict between political accountability and agency independence. This book also compares US with EU and certain UK independent agencies to offer a unique comparative perspective. Included is a first-of-its-kind appendix describing the powers and procedures of the more than 35 independent US federal agencies, with each supplemented by a selective bibliography of pertinent materials.

Independent Agencies in the United States Reviews

Independent Agencies in the United States: Law, Structure, and Politics fills a major gap in administrative law scholarship. Setting the stage with a historical pageant, sweeping from the 19th Century British origins of America's basic regulatory model through its metamorphosis into the multiple types of agencies that exist today, the book provides an intellectually vigorous analysis of the real-world influences on agency decision making. It ranges from such current issues as agency use of private contractors to long-standing issues such as Presidential and Congressional techniques for seeking to direct independent agency activities. The authors' unparalleled experience shines through this outstanding book! * Betty Jo Christian, Partner, Steptoe & Johnson LLP Washington, D.C. *
Independent Agencies in the United States is truly a prodigious feat of scholarship that should be read by anyone with a serious interest in issues of governmental structure and function. Professors Breger and Edles examine not only the agencies generally referred to as 'independent,' like the SEC, but also innumerable other hybrid entities including government corporations and government sponsored enterprises, as well as the increasing trend to privatization of governmental functions. Their balanced treatment of issues that often provoke intense battles of theory and politics insures that this book will be one of the most highly regarded in recent administrative law scholarship. * William V. Luneburg, Professor Emeritus University of Pittsburgh School of Law, Former Chair, ABA Section of Administrative Law & Regulatory Practice *
Independent Agencies in the United States is an enormously ambitious effort that succeeds magnificently. It explains both the meaning of independence and the numerous reasons for seeking it, including both history and theory, and gets down to the nitty-gritty of how independence plays out in its many different ramifications in the real world of administrative law. On top of that, the book includes appendices that spell out for each independent entity those features of independence that it has and does not have, as well as numerous examples of how the many attributes of independence have different manifestations in different settings. In short, this is a book that scholars, practitioners, agency officials, congressional staff, and even students will find of great use. * Alan Morrison, Associate Dean, George Washington Law School, and long-time administrative law practitioner and teacher *
Breger and Edles enormously advance the understanding of the critical independent agency sector by treating the differences between executive and independent agencies as a continuum between executive controllability of agency decisions and the lack thereof. They rely on many legal, political, cultural, and historical factors, and supply fascinating data on how multi-member agencies function as well as comparative material on independent agencies in other legal systems. This rich and nuanced treatment of agency independence will be extremely helpful to scholars of government and to policymakers who are structuring new agencies to address the problems of the future. * Michael Asimow, Visiting Professor, Stanford Law School *
Marshall Breger and Gary Edles have done the unusual. As significant thinkers in the area of administrative law they have written a scholarly work that is also a practical tool for those who deal with the 'independent agencies' of the federal government. Independent Agencies in the United States reads well, is clear, is thoughtful, and a must for those who either study or interact with the federal government. The authors have made a real contribution to both the scholarship and the practical understanding of the federal legal system, and their extensive background in government enriches the text. * Senior Judge Loren A. Smith, United States Court of Federal Claims, and Distinguished Adjunct Professor, George Mason University School of Law *

About Professor Marshall J. Breger (Professor of Law, Professor of Law, The Catholic University of America, Columbus School of Law)

Marshall J. Breger is a Professor of Law at the Columbus School of Law, The Catholic University of America. He was a Senior Fellow at the Heritage Foundation specializing in labor, regulatory and trade policy (including NAFTA). During the George H.W. Bush Administration, he served as Solicitor of Labor, the chief lawyer of the Labor Department, and Chair of the Tripartite Advisory Panel on International Labor Standards (TAPILS). During 1992, by Presidential designation, he served concurrently as Acting Assistant Secretary for Labor Management Standards. He was Chairman of the Administrative Conference of the United States, an independent federal agency charged with developing improvements in the administrative process. Professor Breger is a contributing columnist to Moment magazine. Gary J. Edles is a Fellow in Administrative Law and Adjunct Professor of Law at American University, Washington College of Law, where he teaches a course on the Federal Regulatory Process. He is also Visiting Professor at the University of Hull Law School, where he teaches American Public Law, and lectures on comparative British-American public law. He is licensed as a lawyer in the United States, and is a member of Gray's Inn (UK).

Preface ; Chapter 1: Introduction ; Chapter 2: How the Independent Agency Developed: The Search For Expertise ; A. The Interstate Commerce Commission ; B. The Federal Trade Commission ; C. The Federal Power Commission ; D. The National Labor Relations Board ; E. Federal Reserve Board: Independence as Needed ; F. Observations ; Chapter 3: The Modern Agency: Appointments ; A. Historical Characteristics of Independence ; B. Appointments ; C. Observations ; Chapter 4: The Modern Agency: Removal Protection As An Indicator of Independence ; A. Early Congressional & Judicial Attacks on Removal by the President ; B. The Historic Removal Trilogy: Myers, Humphrey's Executor & Weiner ; C. The Morrison Twist ; D. Grounds for Removal ; E. Procedures for Removal ; F. End of Service ; G. An International Twist on the Removal Issue ; H. Observations ; Chapter 5: Other Indicia of Independence ; A. Control of Agency Submissions to Congress1 ; B. Control of Litigation ; C. Independent Funding Authority ; D. Selection of Agency Vice Chairmen ; E. Other Indicia of Independence ; F. Observations ; Chapter 6: Theories of Agency Independence ; A. Theory of the Unitary Executive ; B. Other Efforts to Centralize Effective Power ; C. The Functionalist Response to the Unitary Executive ; D. Political Will and Independence ; E. Presidential Directive Authority ; F. Observations ; Chapter 7: Internal Agency Operations ; A. Role of the Chairman ; B. Institutional Decisionmaking ; Chapter 8: Institutional Design: The Tension Between Autonomy and Accountability ; A. Introduction ; B. The Staying Power of Independent Regulatory Agencies ; C. The Evolution of Independent Agencies: The Need for Accountability and Centralized Authority ; D. The Application of Centralized Regulatory Review Authority to the Independent Agencies ; E. Divided Accountability: The Separation of Policy and Adversarial Functions within Agencies ; F. Split-Enforcement Model ; G. Shared Regulatory Space: An Assessment ; H. Unsuccessful Shift to the Single Member Option ; I. Successful Shift to the Single Member Option ; J. Independent Oversight Agencies ; K. Independent Agencies Squarely in the Executive Branch ; L. Promoting Executive Branch Autonomy and Accountability to Congress ; M. Inspector Generals ; N. Observations ; Chapter 9: Further Along on the Continuum: Government Function and Private Enterprise ; A. Public Corporations ; B. Government Constraints and Constitutional Obligations on Public Corporations ; C. Government Sponsored Enterprises ; D. Private Action by Federal Agencies ; E. Privatization ; F. Observations ; Chapter 10: The Independent Agency as an Institutional Art Form: Comparative Examples ; A. National Independent Entities: The United Kingdom ; B. The Council of Europe ; C. European Coal and Steel Community ; D. The Transition to a European Union ; E. The European Commission Today ; F. European Independent Agencies ; G. Other International Administration ; H. Observations ; Chapter 11- CONCLUSION: The Future of the Independent Agency ; A. The Changing Face of Independent Agencies ; B. Centralization Theory and the Pushback Against It ; C. Final Thoughts ; Appendix A: Multi-Member Boards and Commissions (With Selective Bibliographies) ; Appendix B: Comparing Independent Agencies ; Bibliography ; Index

Additional information

Sku

NPB9780199812127

ISBN 13

9780199812127

ISBN 10

0199812128

Title

Independent Agencies in the United States: Law, Structure, and Politics by Professor Marshall J. Breger (Professor of Law, Professor of Law, The Catholic University of America, Columbus School of Law)

Author

Professor Marshall J. Breger (Professor of Law, Professor of Law, The Catholic University of America, Columbus School of Law)

Condition

New

Binding type

Hardback

Publisher

Oxford University Press Inc

Year published

2015-05-21

Number of pages

576

Prizes

N/A

Cover note

Book picture is for illustrative purposes only, actual binding, cover or edition may vary.

Note

This is a new book - be the first to read this copy. With untouched pages and a perfect binding, your brand new copy is ready to be opened for the first time

Independent Agencies in the United States Professor Marshall J. Breger (Professor of Law, Professor of Law, The Catholic University of America, Columbus School of Law)

Independent Agencies in the United States by Professor Marshall J. Breger (Professor of Law, Professor of Law, The Catholic University of America, Columbus School of Law)

Summary

Independent Agencies in the United States Summary

Independent Agencies in the United States: Law, Structure, and Politics by Professor Marshall J. Breger (Professor of Law, Professor of Law, The Catholic University of America, Columbus School of Law)

Independent Agencies in the United States Reviews

About Professor Marshall J. Breger (Professor of Law, Professor of Law, The Catholic University of America, Columbus School of Law)

Table of Contents

Additional information

Customer Reviews - Independent Agencies in the United States