In this volume, Baz offersa wide-ranging discussion of Wittgensteins remarks on aspect-perception, with special focus on Wittgensteins method.Bazstarts out with an interpretation of Wittgensteins remarks on aspects and continues with attempts to characterize and defend Wittgensteins approach to the understanding and dissolution of philosophical difficulties.Bazends with attempts to articulateunder the inspiration of Merleau-Pontys phenomenologycertain dissatisfactions, both with Wittgensteins remarks on aspect perception, and with his philosophical approach more generally.

On the way,Bazexplores connections between Wittgensteins remarks on aspects and Kants aesthetics. He examines ways in which the remarks on aspects may be brought to bear on contemporary philosophical work on perception. He discusses some of the implications of Wittgensteins work on aspect perception for issues in moral philosophy and the philosophy of action.