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Control and Game Models of the Greenhouse Effect Herman S.J. Cesar

Control and Game Models of the Greenhouse Effect By Herman S.J. Cesar

Control and Game Models of the Greenhouse Effect by Herman S.J. Cesar


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Summary

This monograph applies game theory models to the environmental problem of the greenhouse effect. It reviews intertemporal optimization models of environmental issues, discusses the issue of sustainability, and analyzes the difference between feedback and open-loop solutions.

Control and Game Models of the Greenhouse Effect Summary

Control and Game Models of the Greenhouse Effect: Economics Essays on the Comedy and Tragedy of the Commons by Herman S.J. Cesar

This book is the result of a four years' research project at the European Uni- versity Institute in Florence, Italy. I am grateful to my supervisor, Mark Salmon, for his many ideas. I am also indebted to my co-supervisor, Aart de Zeeuw, for his and Alister Ulph. unfailing support and to Carlo Carraro, Louis Phlips I gratefully acknowledge the help and assistance of many people that advised at some stage, Scott Barrett, Peter Bohm, Lans Bovenberg, Partha Dasgupta, me Klaus Hasselman, Peter Kort, alIi Tahvonen, Cees Withagen and Clifford Wymer. Thanks also to the faculty and students of the Department of Economics of the European University Institute and especially to Jacqueline, Jessica, Marcia and Barbara for their moral support; my Italian teacher Camilla; my 'Gruppo di Lavoro' Tilman, Peter and Luisa; my dear Dutch friends Yvo, Pieter, Ida and Ellen; international friends Bogdan, Stuart, Melanie, Henning, Anantha, Paolo, Pompeo, Nikos, Christian, Analisa, Dorothea, Valeria and Stefani a; the members of the Working Group of Environmental Studies; and finally my girlfriends who gave up on me because they thought I was working too hard and not spending enough time with them. Also many thanks to my landlady Olga, who taught me the beauty of Italian literature and opera and my landlord Emilio and their dog Igor. I am also greatly indebted to Professor Larry Susskind and to the Massachusetts Institute of Technology where I spent an extremely inspiring semester.

Table of Contents

1 Introduction and Conclusions.- 2 Literature Review.- 2.1 Introduction.- 2.2 The Greenhouse Effect.- 2.2.1 Science.- 2.2.2 Emissions.- 2.2.3 Future Trends.- 2.2.4 Impacts.- 2.2.5 Policy Options for Limiting the Impacts.- 2.2.6 Policy Instruments.- 2.3 Environmental Resource Models.- 2.3.1 Introduction..- 2.3.2 Sustainability.- 2.3.3 Emission Reduction with Fixed Capital Stock.- 2.3.4 Emission Reduction and Capital Accumulation.- 2.3.5 Emission Reduction and Human Capital.- 2.4 The International Dimension.- 2.4.1 Introduction.- 2.4.2 International Pollution Games.- 2.4.3 International Environmental Cooperation.- 2.5 Summary and Conclusion.- 3 Sustainability, Emission Reduction Technology and Human Capital.- 3.1 Introduction.- 3.2 The Rudimentary Model.- 3.2.1 General Description.- 3.2.2 A Numerical Specification of the Model.- 3.2.3 Sustainability.- 3.3 Energy Related Capital.- 3.3.1 General Description of the Model.- 3.3.2 Numerical Results.- 3.4 Human Capital Accumulation.- 3.4.1 General Description.- 3.4.2 Numerical Results.- 3.4.3 The Public Good Character of Human Capital.- 3.5 Summary and Conclusions.- 4 Multi Country Modelling of the Greenhouse Effect.- 4.1 Introduction.- 4.2 Differential Game Theory.- 4.3 Energy-Related Capital in a Multi-Country Model.- 4.3.1 Open-Loop, Feedback and Joint Optimisation.- 4.4 Self-Enforcing International Cooperation.- 4.5 Renegotiation Proofness.- 4.5.1 Renegotiation Proofness in Differential Games.- 4.6 Summary and Conclusions.- 5 Cooperation in a Second-Best World: Technology Transfers and Issue Linkage.- 5.1 Introduction.- 5.2 International Cooperation and Technology Transfers.- 5.2.1 Description of the Model.- 5.2.2 The Absence of Technology Transfers.- 5.2.3 Cooperation and Non-Cooperation in the Presence of Technology Transfers.- 5.2.4 Simulation Results.- 5.3 Issue Linkage in International Environmental Problems.- 5.3.1 Introduction.- 5.3.2 The Analytical Framework for Two-By-Two Games.- 5.3.3 Linkage in Two-By-Two Games.- 5.3.4 Linkage in Differential Games.- 5.4 Summary and Conclusions.- A.- A.l Local Stability Analysis for Section 3.3.1.- A.2 Local Stability Analysis for Section 3.4.1.- B.- B.l Routine to Calculate Riccati Coefficients.- B.2 Example Worked Out.- B.3 Linear-Quadratic Case Worked Out.- B.4 Open-Loop Case.- B.5 Closed-Loop Case.- B.6 ParetoCase.- B.7 Comparison of the Open-loop, Feedback and Cooperative Case.- B.8 Renegotiation Proofness.- B.9 Specification of the Discrete Time Example.- C.- C.l Description of Feedback Solution.- C.2 Proof of Theorems on Linkage.- Literature.- List of Figures.- List of Tables.

Additional information

NLS9783540582205
9783540582205
3540582207
Control and Game Models of the Greenhouse Effect: Economics Essays on the Comedy and Tragedy of the Commons by Herman S.J. Cesar
New
Paperback
Springer-Verlag Berlin and Heidelberg GmbH & Co. KG
1994-08-26
226
N/A
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